Abstract. Leakage resilient cryptography attempts to incorporate sidechannel leakage into the black-box security model and designs cryptographic schemes that are provably secure within it. Informally, a scheme is leakage-resilient if it remains secure even if an adversary learns a bounded amount of arbitrary information about the schemes internal state. Unfortunately, most leakage resilient schemes are unnecessarily complicated in order to achieve strong provable security guarantees. As advocated by Yu et al. [CCS'10], this mostly is an artefact of the security proof and in practice much simpler construction may already suffice to protect against realistic side-channel attacks. In this paper, we show that indeed for simpler constructions leakage-resilience can be obtained when we aim for relaxed security notions where the leakage-functions and/or the inputs to the primitive are chosen non-adaptively. For example, we show that a three round Feistel network instantiated with a leakage resilient PRF yields a leakage resilient PRP if the inputs are chosen non-adaptively (This complements the result of Dodis and Pietrzak [CRYPTO'10] who show that if a adaptive queries are allowed, a superlogarithmic number of rounds is necessary.) We also show that a minor variation of the classical GGM construction gives a leakage resilient PRF if both, the leakage-function and the inputs, are chosen non-adaptively.
Introduction
Traditional cryptographic security notions only consider adversaries who get black-box access to the primitive at hand. That is, an adversary can only observe the input/output behavior of the cryptosystem, but gets no other information about its inner workings. Unfortunately, such black-box security notions are often insufficient to guarantee real-world security of cryptosystems. This is due to information inadvertently emitting from the physical implementation of the cryptosystem, which can be exploited by side-channel attacks. In the last years a large body of theoretical work attempts to incorporate these side-channel attacks into the security model and to design new cryptographic schemes that provably protect against them. Despite important progress in this area, only very few works in the theory community consider how to protect symmetric primitives against leakage attacks. That is somewhat surprising as symmetric primitives such as pseudorandom number generators and block ciphers are the "working horses" of cryptography and are by far the most frequent target of side-channel attacks. Moreover, as frequently pointed out [22, 23] , many of the recent theoretical constructions are rather involved and use techniques which only seem to be required to enable the security proof, and do not necessarily contribute to the real-world security of the system. In this work, we show that simpler and more natural constructions of important symmetric primitives such as pseudorandom functions (PRFs) and pseudorandom permutations (PRPs) are provable leakage resilience if we aim for weaker security notions.
Modeling Leakage Resilience and Weaker Security Notions
As most previous works on leakage-resilient symmetric primitives [4, 20, 1, 23] , we follow Dziembowski and Pietrzak [4] who structure the computation into time steps and require that the leakage given to the adversary is some bounded amount of arbitrary polynomial-time computable information about the data/state that is used during this step. The latter restriction that the leakage function is only applied to the state touched in an invocation was suggested by [19] under the term "only computation leaks information". As the number of invocations of a scheme is usually unbounded, also the amount of leakage can become arbitrarily large.
On granular leakage resilience (gLR). Typically, a time step is one invocation of the scheme that leaks independently from the computation in the previous and next time step. This could for example be the computation of a signature [5] , or the generation of a block of pseudorandom bits for stream-ciphers [4, 20] . In this work, we will follow [1, 22] and consider a more fine grained notion where the construction of some leakage resilient (LR) scheme CS requires several invocations of an underlying cryptographic primitive P, 3 and we require that each invocation of P leaks independently. We call this notion granular leakage-resilience, or gLR for short. We notice that in the literature on leakage resilience even more fine grained models have been considered [9, 3] As side-channel leakage is often a global phenomenon (e.g., in power analysis attacks the adversary measures the global power consumption of the device), the question arises whether such a locality restriction still suffices to model relevant leakages in practice. For certain important leakage classes, we can answer this question affirmatively. For instance, the prominent Hamming weight leakage function can be computed independently from the Hamming weight of the local states. A similar observation works for any affine leakage function.
Formally, we model granularity as follows. Let τ i be the state that is used by the computation (keys, inputs, randomness) in time step i. Before each such step, the adversary can adaptively choose a leakage function f i , and after this step has been processed, she learns f i (τ i ).
On non-adaptive leakage resilience (naLR). Besides granularity, another natural relaxation of leakage resilience, which has been considered in e.g. [23, 1, 22] , is to require that the adversary has to fix the leakage functions in advance before seeing any leakage or outputs. This notion is called non-adaptive leakage resilience, or naLR for short. In the leakage setting, a fully adaptive choice of the leakage function may be an overly powerful model to capture side-channel attacks, as in practice the leakage function is often fixed in advance by the device and the measurement equipment (for more discussion on this cf. [23, 1, 22] ). Also, as discussed in [23] , for stateless cryptographic schemes that do not allow to evolve the secret state, such as PRFs or PRPs, one simply cannot achieve security against adaptively chosen leakage functions: the adversary can just learn the state bit-by-bit by picking for each observation a different leakage function. 4 
Our contributions
In this work, we study various new and existing constructions of leakage-resilient pseudorandom objects. In a nutshell our results can be summarized as follows:
1. We revisit the work of Yu et al. [23] and show that the proof of the proposed (more natural) construction of a non-adaptive leakage-resilient (naLR) stream cipher has a subtle flaw. We propose a simple solution to this problem which unfortunately is impractical. 2. Inspired by the work of Dodis and Pietrzak [1] , we show how to construct a nagLR non-adaptive PRF which is simpler and more natural and avoids the alternating structure used in [1] . 3. We prove that a Feistel network with only 3 rounds, each instantiated with a non-adaptive leakage-resilient non-adaptive PRF, yields a non-adaptive leakage-resilient non-adaptive PRP. This completes a result of [1] who showed that a leakage-resilient PRP requires a superlogarithmic number of rounds instantiated with a leakage-resilient PRF.
We elaborate on these results further below. 4 In this paper we not only differentiate between adaptive/non-adaptive leakage, but also adaptive/non-adaptive PRFs. In the latter non-adaptive means the adversary fixes all inputs in advance. We use the convention that non-adaptive leakage-resilient PRF means the leakage functions are chosen non-adaptively, whereas leakageresilient non-adaptive PRF means the inputs to the PRF are chosen non-adaptively.
Section 2: Yu et al. [23] Revisited. The first leakage resilient symmetric primitive was the stream-cipher construction proposed by Dziembowski and Pietrzak in [4] . This construction has later been simplified in [20] using a weak PRF and is illustrated in Figure 1 . Fig. 1 . Construction SCALT of a leakage resilient stream-cipher from any (weak) PRF F [20] . The initial secret key is X0, K0, K1, the output is X0, X1, . . ..
The constructions from [4, 20] use an alternating structure (cf. Figure 1 ) and requires the secret state to hold two secret keys K i , K i+1 for the underlying weak PRF F (a weak PRF is only guaranteed to be random on random inputs). The alternating structure enforces independence between inputs X i and keys K i , but seems mostly motivated by the security proof rather than contributing much to the scheme's real-world security.
Yu et al. [23] advocate that already much simpler constructions will be secure against most practically relevant side-channel attacks. They propose a more natural construction SC SEQ from any wPRF F as illustrated in Figure 2 . The secret state of this scheme consists of only a single secret key K i for F, and two fixed public random values p 0 , p 1 which are used alternately as inputs to F. This scheme is not leakage resilience if the leakage functions can be chosen adaptively, which is easily seen by the so-called "precomputation" attack: as we know p 0 , p 1 , in the i th round we can choose a leakage function f i which (using its input K i−1 ) computes a future key K t (for some t > i) and leaks some bits about it. As we can do this for any i < t, we can (for a sufficiently large t) learn the entire K t .
It is claimed in [23] that the construction from Figure 2 is a naLR stream cipher. Note that the precomputation attack becomes infeasible if one must choose the leakage functions f i before seeing p 0 , p 1 , as now f i (K i−1 , p i−1 mod 2 ) cannot compute the future key K i+1 = F(K i , p i mod 2 ). Unfortunately, as we discuss in Section 2, the main technical lemma used in their proof has a subtle flaw, and thus the security proof is incorrect. Currently, we do not know if the construction is actually insecure, or if the proof can be salvaged. Our counterexample showing that their main lemma is flawed does not lead to an actual attack on the naLR security of the cipher.
The proof in [23] uses a lemma from [20] which states that the output F(K, X) of a weak PRF F is pseudorandom, even if K, X only have high pseudoentropy and are independent. The flaw in their proof roots from the fact that the input p 0 is reused every second round (cf. Figure 2) , and thus already in the 3rd round, where one computes K 3 ← F(K 2 , p 0 ), the key K 2 is not independent from p 0 , which means one cannot apply the lemma from [20] [20] in a tree-like construction (inspired by the classical GGM construction.). Their construction is rather involved, as the alternating structure of the stream-cipher must be preserved within the tree like structure of the GGM transformation.
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We propose a much simpler construction illustrated in Figure 3 , which we get by using the naLR stream cipher SC + SEQ (discussed in the previous section) within a GGM-like tree-structure. One may expect that starting with naLR streamcipher like SC + SEQ and use it within GGM, we obtain a naLR PRF. Surprisingly, we show that this intuition is wrong. In fact, our construction in Figure 3 can be completely broken even using only non-adaptive leakage.
Our attack exploits the fact that, even though the leakage-functions cannot be adaptively chosen, the inputs to the PRF can be chosen adaptively. In particular, the choice of the inputs can depend on the public values p i . Intuitively, this allows us to commit to exponentially many leakage functions (one for each input to the PRF) at the beginning, and only later, when we learn the p i 's we can choose which leakage function to choose by choosing the appropriate input to the PRF adaptively. 6 On the positive side, we show that our construction Γ F,m is a nagLR non-adaptive PRF, that is, it is secure if not only the leakage-function, but also the inputs to Γ F,m are chosen non-adaptively. This, of course, is a strong assumption, but for some important applications, like the initialization of a stream cipher [22] , such a non-adaptive PRF is sufficient (in fact, here even a weak PRF is sufficient). Also, we would like to mention that in practice many side-channel attacks, such as DPA attacks, work by measuring the power consumption of the device on random inputs. Our security analysis incorporates such important attacks where the adversary exploits leakages from random inputs to the cryptographic scheme. We emphasize that, of course, our construction is an adaptively secure PRF in the black-box sense.
Section 4: Leakage-Resilient PRPs. A classical result by Luby and Rackoff [16] shows that a three-round Feistel (cf. Figure 4 ) network, where each round is instantiated with a secure PRF, is a secure PRP. Dodis and Pietrzak [1] show that three-round Feistel networks cannot be leakage resilient. More precisely, they show that every Feistel network with a constant number of rounds (using any perfectly leakage resilient round functions, e.g. a random oracle) can be broken using only very simple leakage (e.g., the Hamming-weight of the inputs to the round functions). On the positive side, they show that a Feistel network with a super-logarithmic number of rounds instantiated with L-LR PRFs is a L-gLR PRP for any class L of leakage functions. Here, L is some class of admissible leakage functions, which in our case will usually be all polynomial-time computable functions with range {0, 1} λ for some λ ∈ N. The aforementioned attack requires that one can query the PRF adaptively. We show that this is inherent by proving that a 3-round Feistel instantiated with L-LR PRFs yields a L-gLR non-adaptive PRP. This again illustrates the power of non-adaptivity in the leakage setting.
More Related Work
We notice that an alternative way to construct symmetric leakage resilient primitives is by using techniques from leakage resilient circuit compilers. Leakageresilient circuit compilers allow to transform any circuit, e.g., an implementation of the AES, into a transformed circuit that is protected against certain classes of leakage attacks. This line of research was initiated by Ishai et al. [14] who show security against probing attacks. This result was recently generalized to a setting where leakages can be described by an AC0 circuit [6] . The works that are most relevant to ours are recent leakage-resilient circuit compilers in the "only computation leaks" setting [15, 9, 3, 10] . While on the positive side such compilers allow to provably protect any cryptographic scheme against certain classes of leakage, they typically make strong granularity assumptions and are inefficient. An approach exploiting parallelism to achieve practically efficient leakageresilient block-ciphers was put forward by Medwed, Standaert and Joux in these proceedings [18] .
Notation & Basic Definitions
In this section, we present some basic notation and definitions that will be used throughout this paper.
Strings & Sets. Concatenation of two strings x, y is denoted x y, or, if no confusion is possible, simply xy. For X ∈ {0, 1} n we denote with X[i] the i th bit of X and with X |i the i bit prefix of X. [a, b] denotes the interval {a, a + 1, . . . , b}, [b] is short for [1, b] . For a set X , X ∈ R X denotes that X is assigned a value sampled uniformly at random from X . For a distribution D, we denote X ← D the random variable X sampled from the distribution D. To abbreviate notation, we often identify random variables with their distribution.
Functions. R m,n denotes the set of all functions {0, 1} m → {0, 1} n , P n the set of all permutation over {0, 1} n .
Distance. With δ D (X; Y ) we denote the advantage of a circuit D in distinguishing the random variables X, Y , i.e.: Entropies. We recall some basic definitions for different types of entropy.
A "computational" version of min-entropy called HILL-pseudoentropy was introduced in [12] .
Definition 2. We say X has HILL pseudoentropy k, denoted by H
Dodis et al. [2] , and Hsiao et al. [13] extended the above notions to analyze what happens to the min-entropy (resp. HILL-pseudoentropy) of a random variable X given a possibly correlated random variable Z. A computational version was given in [13] and is formally defined as follows: Definition 4. Let (X, Z) be a pair of random variables. X has conditional HILL pseudoentropy at least k conditioned on
Pseudorandomness. Pseudorandomness is a fundamental and extremely useful cryptographic concept. Informally, an object (such as a bit-string, function or permutation) is pseudorandom if (1) it can be efficiently implemented using a small amount of randomness and (2) it cannot be distinguished from the corresponding uniformly random object by any efficient algorithm. A basic building block to generate pseudorandomness that will be used a basic building block in our constructions is a weak pseudorandom function (weak PRF). In contrast to standard PRFs, the notion of a weak PRF is weaker, as its output only has to be pseudorandom for random inputs. We recall the definition of (weak) PRFs/PRPs below.
n is an (ǫ, s, q)-pseudorandom function (PRF) if no adversary A of size s can distinguish F(K, ·) (instantiated with a random key K) from a random function R ← R m,n . More precisely, for any A of size s that can make up toueries to its oracle, we have
A non-adaptive PRF is defined similarly, except that we only consider nonadaptive adversaries who must choose the queries X 1 , . . . , X q before seeing any outputs. A weak PRF is defined similarly, except that the inputs X 1 , . . . , X q are chosen uniformly at random and not chosen by A. A (non-adaptive/weak) pseudorandom permutation (PRP) is defined analogously, except that we require F(K, .) to be a permutation for every K.
Stream Ciphers
The stream cipher construction SCSEQ from a weak PRF F from [23] . K0 is the secret initial key, p0, p1 are public random values and X1, X2, . . . is the output. The leakage leading to our counterexample to Lemma 3 from [23] is shown in gray.
A stream cipher is a function SC : {0, 1} k → {0, 1} k × {0, 1} n that, for every key K 0 , defines a sequence X 1 , X 2 , . . . of outputs which are recursively defined as
The security notion for stream ciphers requires that for a random initial secret key K 0 ∈ R {0, 1} k , the outputs X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X ℓ are pseudorandom. A stream cipher is leakage-resilient [4] if, for any ℓ, the outputs X ℓ , X ℓ+1 , . . . are pseudorandom given X 0 , X 1 , . . . , X ℓ−1 and a bounded amount of adaptively chosen leakage Λ 0 , Λ 1 , . . . , Λ ℓ−1 . This leakage is computed as follows: for any i = 0, 1, . . . , ℓ − 2, before (K i+1 , X i+1 ) ← SC(K i ) is computed, an adversary chooses a leakage function f i with range {0, 1} λ (the parameter λ ∈ N bounds the amount of leakage we allow per round), and then gets
is the part of the secret state which is accessed during the evaluation of SC(K i ).
Yu, Standaert, Pereira and Yung [23] propose a construction, SC SEQ , illustrated in Figure 2 . As outlined in the introduction this construction is vulnerable to the precomputation attack if the leakage functions can be chosen adaptively depending on the public values. In [23] it is claimed that it satisfies a relaxed notion of leakage-resilience where the leakage functions f 1 , f 2 , . . . are chosen nonadaptively.
The construction is initialized with a secret key K 0 ∈ R {0, 1} k for a wPRF F : {0, 1} k × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} m and two public random values p 0 , p 1 ∈ R {0, 1} n (although these values are public, it will be crucial that the adversary chooses the leakage functions before seeing these values.) The output is recursively computed as
The proofs in [20, 23] use a lemma which states that the output of a weak PRF on a random input is pseudorandom even if the key is not uniform, but only has high min-entropy.
Proposition 1 (wPRF with non-uniform keys, Lemma 2 from [20] ).
n be uniform and K ∈ {0, 1} k be any random variable which is independent of X and has min-entropy
Quantitatively, (X, F(K, X)) cannot be distinguished by adversaries of size ≈ sǫ 2 with advantage ≈ ǫ2 λ , so we have a loss of 8 ǫ 2 in circuit size and 2 λ in distinguishing advantage. The reduction makes O(λ/ǫ 2 ) queries, so q has to be at least that large.
The other main ingredient of the proof is a theorem from [4] , 9 which states that a pseudorandom value Z ∈ {0, 1} k has whp. HILL pseudoentropy almost k − λ given any λ bits of auxiliary information A about Z. In our case, Z will be (X, F(K, X)) as in eq.(2) and A will be leakage f (X, X) ∈ {0, 1} λ . Concretely, we get Proposition 2. For F, X, K as in Proposition 1 and f any leakage function with range {0, 1}
8 Let us note that there is a typo in the conference version of [20] (the t 2 in eq.(3) shoud be t), suggesting that the loss in circuit size is only ǫ, not ǫ 2 . 9 A more general "dense model theorem" was independently given in [21] , cf. [7] for a good overview where s ′ ≈ sǫ 4 2 4λ and ǫ ′ = ǫ2 2λ , so setting, say λ = log(ǫ −1 /4), 10 we get
Before we turn to the problem with the security proof in [23] , let us consider a slightly different construction which we will call SC + SEQ . This construction is defined like SC SEQ , except that we use a fresh random input
n and flip a coin b ← {0, 1}. The adversary gets the public values p 0 , . . . , p L−1 , the outputs X 1 , . . . , X L ′ and leakage Λ 1 , . . . , Λ L ′ , where
. . , X L . We must prove, that she cannot guess b with probability much better than 1/2.
We will prove that K L ′ is indistinguishable from aK L ′ which has k − λ bits of average min-entropy given the view view L ′ of the adversary after L ′ rounds, where view i denotes the view of the adversary after the ith round, i.e.
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view i = {p 0 , . . . , p i−1 , X 1 , . . . , X i , Λ 1 , . . . , Λ i } This will prove the theorem, as by eq.(3) and the fact that the p L ′ +1 , . . . , p L are all chosen uniformly at random the remaining outputs X L ′ +1 , . . . , X L will be pseudorandom. To see that K L ′ has high conditional pseudoentropy given view L ′ we proceed in rounds, showing that for any j ≤ L ′ , if K j−1 has high conditional pseudoentropy given view j−1 , then K j has high pseudoentropy given view j . For j = 1 this follows directly from eq.(3) as (K 1 , X 1 ) ← F(K 0 , p 0 ), where K 0 and p 0 are uniform. 10 I.e. the leakage bound λ = log(ǫ −1 )/4 is a function of the distinguishing advantage of the best distinguisher for the weak PRF F: If F is secure against polynomial-size distinguishers (i.e. ǫ = ω(log k)), λ is superlogarithmic in the security parameter k. If F is exponentially hard, λ can be linear in k. 11 Due to the very loose reductions in [20, 7] , these bounds will not imply any practical security guarantees if instantiated with a standard block cipher where k is typically something like 128 or 256. To get practical bounds, one would have to make idealized assumptions like assuming F is a random orcale [23] . 12 Note that we only include p0, . . . , pi−1 into viewi, but in the actual security experiment the adversary gets to see all the p0, . . . , pL right away. We can do so as we only consider non-adaptive adversaries and the pi's are chosen uniformly at random.
After the first round whp. K 1 has conditional pseudoentropy k − 2λ given view 1 . Thus, there exists aK 1 with average min-entropy H ∞ (K 1 |view 1 ) = k − 2λ that is indistinguishable from K 1 (given view 1 ). Because of this, in the above experiment we can replace K 1 withK 1 and the probability that A will finally guess b correctly can only change by a negligible amount (otherwise A would constitute a distinguisher for K 1 andK 1 .) We proceed as above for
As the p i are independent of K i , we get by Proposition 1 the claimed statement.
⊓ ⊔ Let us go back to the construction SC SEQ from [23] , where we alternate between two inputs p 0 , p 1 instead of using a fresh p i for every round. Towards proving that this construction is a naLR stream-cipher, we can proceed as in the proof of Theorem 1 for the first two rounds arguing that K 1 and K 2 are indistinguishable fromK 1 ,K 2 satisfying H ∞ (K i |view i ) = k − 2λ, but the 3rd step becomes more difficult.
The reason is that (in our adapted experiment, where K i got replaced with K i for i = 1, 2) we compute K 3 ← F(K 2 , p 0 ); but p 0 is clearly not random (and independent) given the view of A, as p 0 was already used in the first round. Thus we cannot just apply Proposition 1 eq. (2) to conclude that the next key K 3 to be computed has high conditional pseudoentropy.
The authors of [23] are well aware of this problem. In order to "enforce" independence betweenK 2 and p 0 , they put forward a lemma which claims these values become independent when given the leakage from the previous round (for clarity, we only state their lemma for the case of K 3 ) Lemma 1 (Lemma 3 [23] ).K 2 and {p 0 , p 1 , X 1 , X 2 , Λ 1 } are independent given {p 1 , Λ 2 }.
Although this approach looks promising, unfortunately, it turns out that this lemma is wrong (already for λ = 1) as can be seen by a simple counterexample illustrated in Figure 2 : choose leakage functions f 1 , f 2 that output the first bits
First, we observe that in our adapted experiment where we replace the K i 's (having only conditional pseudoentropy) withK i 's (having min-entropy), Λ 1 , Λ 2 will be the first bits ofK 1 andK 1 ⊕K 2 . To see this, just note that, e.g., K 1 and K 1 are indistinguishable given Λ 1 = K 1 [1] , this can only be the case if K 1 and K 1 agree on the first bit. To see why the lemma is flawed, we first observe that if Fig. 3 . Illustration of Γ F,m for m = 2. p0, p1 and p2 are the random public values and Kε = K is the initial random key of the PRF. The output of the PRF for each X ∈ {0, 1} 2 is represented by ZX , i.e., the leaves of the tree.
In [1] Dodis and Pietrzak construct a nagLR PRF from any wPRF F. Informally, a PRF is leakage resilient if its outputs on all "fresh" inputs are pseudorandom, even if the adversary can query the PRF, and besides the outputs also gets the leakage from these computations. 13 In this section we propose a much simpler construction than the one from [1] , which is a nagLR non-adaptive PRF, that is, it remains secure if not only the leakage function, but also the inputs are chosen non-adaptively.
We define a naLR PRF by considering an adversary A who has access to two oracles: the challenge and the leakage oracle. The first is as in Definition 5, i.e., either it is the pseudorandom function F(K, ·), or a random function R ← R. The latter oracle F f (K, ·) can be queried on some input X ∈ {0, 1} m and returns F(K, X) together with the leakage f (K, X), where f is the leakage function nonadaptively chosen at the beginning of the experiment.
14 Of course, the queries to the two oracles must be disjoint.
n is a (ǫ, s, q)-secure L-naLR PRF if for any A of size s that can make up to q disjoint queries to its two oracles, and for any leakage function f ∈ L, we have
We will mostly omit the parameters ǫ, s and q and say that F is a L-naLR PRF if ǫ is some negligible function in k and s, q are superpolynomial in k.
A L-naLR non-adaptive PRF is defined equivalently, except that A must choose the q PRF input queries non-adaptively.
Recall that naLR security denotes L-naLR security where L is the class of all efficiently computable functions with range {0, 1} λ for some λ ∈ N. In this section, we will only consider this special case, but we gave the general definition as it will be used in the next section. As outlined in the introduction, stateless (cf. Footnote 10) na-LR naPRFs don't exist, and thus following [22, 1] , we consider a "granular" nagLR-security notion, informally discussed in Section 1.1. Our construction Γ F,m , illustrated in Figure 3 , is inspired by the classical GGM construction of a PRF from a PRG [8] . On input X ∈ {0, 1} m computes its output Z X by invoking a wPRF F m + 1 times sequentially. The inputs to the m + 1 invocations are fixed random public values p 0 , . . . , p m . The ith bit of the input X[i] determines which half of the output of F in the ith invocation is used as a key for the (i + 1)th invocation.
Let us define the PRF Γ F,m : {0, 1} k+(m+1)ℓ × {0, 1} m → {0, 1} n , which uses a wPRF F : {0, 1} k × {0, 1} ℓ → {0, 1} 2k as main building block. The secret key is K ← {0, 1}
k and moreover we sample m + 1 random public values p = p 0 , . . . , p m ← {0, 1}
ℓ . Below we define how the output Z X is computed by Γ F,m (K, p, X) in pseudocode. We explicitly state which bit of the input is read as this will determine the inputs that the leakage functions will get. With F 0 (K, X) and F 1 (K, X) we denote the function computing F(K, X) but only outputting the left and right half of the output, respectively.
, where X ∈ {0, 1} m and K ← {0, 1} k : Set i := 0 and K ε := K Repeat:
i := i + 1.
Read the input bit
We think of the above computation as being performed in m + 1 time steps. Each of the m loops, and the final computation of Z X , is a time step. Thus, the nagLR non-adaptive PRF security notion allows the adversary to initially choose a leakage function f : {0, 1} ℓ × {0, 1} k × {0, 1} → {0, 1} λ and inputs to the two oracles. For every input X to the F f (K, .) oracle, the adversary gets F (K, X) and leakage
, we can actually handle somewhat stronger leakage functions which not only get the bit X[i] of X touched in the ith time step, but all the bits X |i of X touched so far, i.e.
The interpretation here is, that the leakage function f knows exactly at which node of the tree it is. We are now ready to prove our main theorem in this section
2k is a weak PRF, then Γ F,m is a nagLR non-adaptive PRF. The amount of leakage λ per time step (i.e., for each invocation of F) depends on the security of F (cf. Footnote 10)
Proof. Let A be an adversary which initially chooses a leakage function f (as described above), q distinct inputs x 1 , . . . , x q and some q 0 , meaning that the first q 0 queries will be leakage queries, and the last q 1 := q − q 0 queries are challenge queries. We sample a random key K ← {0, 1} k and a coin b ← {0, 1} determining if we're in the real or random experiment (note that we do not yet sample the p 0 , . . . , p m ← {0, 1} ℓ .) We now evaluate allueries simultaneously, going down the tree as illustrated in Figure 3 layer by layer, sampling the random p i 's as we go down (this parallel evaluation is only possible as the queries are chosen non-adaptively.) It will be convenient to give the adversary the leakage for allueries (even though the last q 1 challenge queries are not supposed to leak at all), except for the very last layer. In the last layer, we evaluate the first q 0 queries, and give the adversary this outputs together with the leakage. If b = 0 (which means we're in the real experiment) the adversary gets the outputs, and random values otherwise.
Below we formally describe how the leakage is computed. As just mentioned, we give the adversary more power than required for nagLR-security. Concretely, in item 2 below, she gets leakage from internal nodes on all queries, not just he leakage queries. Set i := 0, sample a random K = K ε , and then the outputs and leakage are computed layer by layer as follows:
1. sample a random p i and give it to the adversary. 2. compute K I 0 K I 1 := F(K I , p i ) and leakage Λ I := f (K I , p i , I) for all i bit prefixes of x 1 , . . . , x q . Give all the computed leakage to the adversary. 3. If i < m − 1 then set i := i + 1 and go back to step 1, otherwise go to next step (at this point we have computed K xi for all queries x i .) 4. sample a random p m and give it to the adversary. 5. Compute the final outptus Z xi := F(K xi , p m ) = Γ F,m (K, x i ) and leakage Λ xi := f (X x1 , p m , x i ) for i = 1, . . . , q 0 . Give this outptus and leakage to the adversary. Consider the computation
As K ε has min-entropy n − 2λ (in fact, in this first layer, this key is even uniform) and p 0 is uniform, by Proposition 1 K 0 K 1 is pseudorandom given p 0 , and by Proposition 2 K 0 K 1 has (whp.) HILL pseudoentropy 2n − 2λ when additionally given Λ ε . The first hybrid view 1 is dervied from the hybrid view 0 by replacing this K 0 K 1 with a random variableK 0 K 1 which has min-entorpy 2n − 2λ given p 0 , Λ ε . By the definition of HILL pseudoentropy, such aK 0 K 1 exists, where view 0 and view 1 are computationally indistinguishable. Thus, in view 1 , the inputsK 0 andK 1 to the first layer (which are outptus from the zero layer) have min-entropy n − 2λ, and by Proposition 1, each outputs of this layer will have pseudoentropy n−2λ given the entire view of the adversary. The hybrid view 2 is derived from view 1 by replacing this outputs which have min-entropy n − 2λ, and so on, until we get the hybrid view m−1 which is indistinguishable from view 0 . In view m−1 , the inputsK xi to the last layer has min-entropy n − 2λ. We choose p m uniformly at random, and it follows by Proposition 1, that the "challange" outputs Z xi := F(K xi , p m ) are pseudorandom, and thus indistinguishable from view m which is derived from view m−1 by replacing all challange outputs by uniformly random values (as in the case b = 1.) ⊓ ⊔
An Adaptive Attack Against Our Construction Γ F,m
In Theorem 2 we showed that Γ F,m is a nagLR non-adaptive PRF. As discussed in Section 1.2, it trivially is not a naLR non-adaptive PRF or gLR non-adaptive PRF, i.e. the non-adaptivity and granularity for the leakage are necessary. It is a natural question whether it is a nagLR PRF like the (much more sophisticated) construction from [1] ).
We answer this question negatively and show a simple attack against Γ F,m . The attack allows the adversary to learn leakage that reveals the first λ bits of Γ F,m (K, X) for an input X that has not yet been queried. Clearly, this breaks the security of the PRF as required by Definition 6. Suppose m = ℓ + 1, then the attack works as follows:
1. Define f (p m−1 , K I , I) to be the first λ bits of F(F 0 (K I , p m−1 ), I).
2. Learn the public values p 0 , . . . , p m ∈ {0, 1} ℓ . 3. Query the leakage oracle for p m ||1 and obtain Γ F,m (K, p m ||1) and, from the leakage, the first λ bits of
Thus, for a leakage query p m ||1 the attack reveals the first λ bits of Γ F,m (K, p m ||0). We emphasize that this attack is rather artificial and most likely will not affect the real-world security of our construction. However, it illustrates that any attempt to prove the security of Γ F,m in an adaptive setting must fail (indeed, this attack works even if we assign a different public value to every node -details are omitted in this extended abstract).
Let us emphasize that this attack requires that for each execution of the weak PRF F the corresponding leakage function is "aware" of its current position in the tree, that is, we need a leakage function as in eq. (5) and not eq.(4). Although for our positive result considering a stronger leakage model only strengthens the result, for an attack we would like the model to be as weak as possible and stick with leakage functions that only get whatever is touched, and nothing beyond that, as required for nagLR PRFs. We do not know if such an attack exists against Γ F,m .
Leakage-Resilient PRPs
In the previous section we gave a simple construction of a PRF which is secure against non-adaptive leakage if queried on non-adaptively chosen inputs. In practice, one usually doesn't use pseudorandom functions, but rather pseudorandom permutations (PRPs). In particular, block ciphers, the work horses of cryptography, are assumed to be PRPs. Block ciphers are also the main targets of side-channel cryptanalysts, thus coming up with leakage-resilient PRPs is a particularly worthwhile task.
In the standard setting (i.e. without leakage), Luby and Rackoff [16] famously showed that one can construct a PRP from a PRF by using a three-round Feistel network as illustrated in Figure 4 . With one round more one even gets a strong PRP, i.e. an object that is indistinguishable from a uniformly random permutation even if one can query it from both sides.
To prove that a 3-round Feistel using PRFs as round functions is a PRP one proceeds in two steps. 15 First one shows that a 3-round Feistel instantiated with uniformly random functions is indistinguishable from a uniformly random permutation (this step is completely information theoretic). In the second step one then observes that a 3-round Feistel instantiated with URFs (uniformly random functions) is indistinguishable from a 3-round Feistel using PRFs. This second step follows by a simple hybrid argument where we replace the pseudorandom round functions with uniformly random functions one by one. A restricted case of the statement claiming only non-adaptive security and using only random functions as round functions, is given by the proposition below.
Proposition 3 (3-Round Feistel is Non-Adaptively Secure PRP). For any n, q ∈ N and x 1 , . . . , x q ∈ {0, 1} 2n consider the distributions:
-Sample P ∈ R P 2n and, for i ∈ [q], set y i = P(x i ). Figure 4 ) Figure 4 .) As F 1 is a URF, these c i 's will contain a collision with probability at most q(q − 1)/2 n+1 . Assuming they are all distinct, the u i = F 2 (c i )⊕a i 's are uniformly random as F 2 is a URF. As they are uniformly random, they also will contain a collision with with probability at most q(q − 1)/2 n+1 . This implies the values z i = u i v i are 2 · q(q − 1)/2 n+1 = q(q − 1)/2 n close to uniform over {0, 1}
2n . The uniform distribution over q elements over {0, 1} 2n is q(q − 1)/2 2n close to the distribution of the y 1 , . . . , y q (which is uniform, but without repetition.) Thus, as statistical distance obeys the triangle inequality, the z i 's are q(q − 1)/2 n + q(q − 1)/2 2n ≤ q 2 /2 n close to the y i 's. ⊓ ⊔ Proposition 3 also holds if the inputs x i are chosen adaptively, but the proof for this case is significantly more delicate. The proof of Proposition 3 above uses the fact that the inputs c 1 , . . . , c q to the second round function (cf. Figure 4 ) are all distinct (with high probability). The adaptive case also goes along these lines, but here one has to argue that the c i 's are also "hidden", as an adaptive adversary who could "guess" the c i values could compute inputs to the Feistel network where the outputs partially collide. As shown in [1] , it is already sufficient to get some simple leakage (e.g. the Hamming Weight) of the c i values to launch such an attack. This attack can be adapted to work on Feistel networks with any number r of rounds, but its complexity (i.e. number of adaptive queries) grows exponentially in r. Still, this implies that a constant-round Feistel network, instantiated with leakage-resilient PRFs, can be broken in polynomial time, and thus is not a leakage-resilient PRP.
The queries to the Feistel network made in the [1] attack are adaptive, and here we show that this is indeed crucial. By Theorem 3 below, a 3-round Feistel is a non-adaptively secure leakage-resilient PRP if instantiated with leakageresilient PRFs. The notion of leakage-resilience achieved by the PRP is inherited from the underlying PRF. If the round functions are L-naLR PRFs, then we get a L-nagLR PRP.
More formally, we initially choose a bit b ∈ {0, 1} and three keys k 1 , k 2 , k 3 for F which defines the round functions F i (.) = F(k i , .) for i = {1, 2, 3}, and if b = 1 a random permutation P ∈ R P 2n (using lazy sampling.) The adversary can initially choose three leakage functions f 1 , f 2 , f 3 ∈ L, distinct inputs a i b i for i = 1, . . . , q and some q 0 which specifies that the first q 0 inputs are leakage queries, and the last q 1 := q − q 0 are challange queries (as we consider nonadaptive queries, we can wlog. assume the queries are ordered like this.) She then gets, for every i ≤ q 0 , the outputs u i v i = Φ F1,F2,F3 (a i b i ) and the leakage f 1 (k 1 , a i ), f 2 (k 2 , c i ) and f 3 (k 3 , u i ) (so, each round of the Feistel network is considered a time-step which leaks independently.) For the queries i > q 0 she gets the regular output Φ F1,F2,F3 (a i b i ) if b = 0 and the random P(a i b i ) otherwise. Note that besides the evaluation of the round functions F i , one also has to compute three XORs. It would be cheating to assume that this XORs are leakage free. We go to the other extreme, and assume the XORs leak completely by giving the adversary the entire c i value for every leakage query. This c i together with the known values a i , b i , u i , v i specifies all the inputs/outputs to the three XOR computations (e.g. the first XOR takes as inputs b i and b i ⊕ c i .) Claim. The c i 's corresponding to theueries are distinct with probability at least q(q − 1)/2 n+1 + ǫ.
Proof. To see this, let δ denote the probability that the c i 's collide; we can construct a non-adaptive q-query distinguisher for F with advantage δ − q(q − 1)/2 n+1 (note that as F is an ǫ-secure PRF this will imply that δ ≤ q(q − 1)/2 n+1 + ǫ as claimed.) This distinguisher simply queries its oracle (which is either a URF or F(k, .)) on inputs a 1 , . . . , a q , obtaining z 1 , . . . , z q ; the oracle outputs 1 if and only if any of the z i ⊕ b i collide. If the outputs come from a URF, this probability is q(q − 1)/2 n+1 , whereas if they come from F(k, .) this probability is δ by definition. This concludes the proof of the claim.
⊓ ⊔ Now assume all the c i 's are distinct. Conditioned on this, we can show by a similar argument that also all the u i = F 2 (k 2 , c i ) ⊕ a i will be distinct with probability q(q − 1)/2 n+1 + ǫ. Assume the c i 's and u i 's are all distinct and recall that v i = F 3 (k 3 , u i ) ⊕ c i . Then it follows from the L-naLR non-adaptive PRF security of F that the y ′ i = u q0+i v q0+i values for i = 1, . . . , q 1 are pseudorandom given y 1 , . . . , y q0 and Λ 1 , . . . , Λ q0 , as F 2 (k 2 , .) and F 3 (k 3 , .) are queried on distinct inputs in the first q 0 and the last q 1 queries.
⊓ ⊔
